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| ===== Scenario Methods ===== | ===== Scenario Methods ===== |
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| This page is an evolving, non-exhaustive collection of different methods and techniques that can be used in scenario building, particularly focusing on the ones that might be useful for Future Fabulators. There are many academic papers and consultants' websites describing a myriad of approaches describing "how to build scenarios" and what different types of scenarios exist. Though possibly oversimplifying the issue, we could say that for Future Fabulators the most important difference between methods is whether the scenarios are designed to be exploratory (multiple alternative scenarios for different possible futures), or normative (designing a desired scenario, then figuring out what needs to be done in order to get there). When working with normative scenarios the most important task is 'backcasting' or 'retrocasting' as we prefer to call it (see chapter about this lower on this page). With exploratory scenarios a lot of the time is spent on creating the elements of the scenario based on the present conditions of the internal and external environment, as well as forces that can influence change in both. Most scenario methods revolve around approximately the same phases: (1) delineating the space/issue/question (2) identifying elements of the scenario (factors, drivers, trends, measures, actors, events...) 3) selecting a reasonable amount of elements 4) projecting (extrapolating, forecasting...) the elements into (different) future(s) and 5) using scenarios to (re)design decisions, strategies and actions in the present. Of course it is possible to work with exploratory scenarios first to get to a preferred one, then use retrocasting to flesh out how we could get from here to there. There are many different variations of scenario building flow, and we won't attempt to collect them all. | This page is an evolving, non-exhaustive collection of different methods and techniques that can be used in scenario building, particularly focusing on the ones that might be useful for Future Fabulators. There are many academic papers and consultants' websites describing a myriad of approaches describing "how to build scenarios" and what different types of scenarios exist. Though possibly oversimplifying the issue, we could say that for Future Fabulators the most important difference between methods is whether the scenarios are designed to be exploratory (multiple alternative scenarios for different possible futures), or normative (designing a desired scenario, then figuring out what needs to be done in order to get there). When working with normative scenarios the most important task is 'backcasting' or 'retrocasting' as we prefer to call it (see chapter about retrocasting lower on this page). With exploratory scenarios a lot of the time is spent on creating the elements of the scenario based on the present conditions of the internal and external environment, as well as forces that can influence change in both. Most scenario methods revolve around approximately the same phases: (1) delineating the space/issue/question (2) identifying elements of the scenario (factors, drivers, trends, measures, actors, events...) 3) selecting a reasonable amount of elements 4) projecting (extrapolating, forecasting...) the elements into (different) future(s) and 5) using scenarios to (re)design decisions, strategies and actions in the present. |
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| Our filter is looking at approaches that can help us move from forecasting to embodiment, from story to experience. As in Ffab we are primarily focused on creating (immersive) situations where possible futures / parallel histories or presents can be experienced (and then reflecting on how this experience can affect our present behaviours), it isn't extremely important for us to have the most accurate representation of past, present and possible futures, but we're more curious to uncover conscious and unconscious assumptions that the participants might have about their lives and environments. The scenario process uses these assumptions as if they were clay, and shapes storyworlds out of them. In the process the awareness of the assumptions grows through a non-judgmental observation, through several waves of analysis and synthesis. The most rewarding moment in scenario building (in our experience) is when participants begin to recognise different scenarios as extreme versions or caricatures of their present, as if they have acquired a mysterious search-light, that can be used to illuminate different parts of an otherwise murky, entangled situation. Looking at existing scenario building methods, we'd like to amplify this moment of clarity, perhaps try to bring it forward in the scenario flow, as the whole process after it becomes more fluid, creative and mindful (of self, others and the environment. | There are many different variations of scenario building flow, and we won't attempt to collect them all. Our filter is looking at approaches that can help us move from forecasting to embodiment, from story to experience. As in Ffab we are primarily focused on creating (immersive) situations where possible futures / parallel histories or presents can be physically experienced (and then reflecting on how this experience can affect our present behaviours), it isn't extremely important for us to have the most accurate representation of past, present and possible futures. We're more curious to uncover conscious and unconscious assumptions that the participants might have about their lives and environments and seeing how these assumptions shape and distort their images of the future. The scenario process uses these assumptions as if they were clay to create storyworlds out of them. In the process the awareness of the assumptions grows through non-judgmental observation and several waves of analysis and synthesis. The most rewarding moment in scenario building (in our experience) is when participants begin to recognise different scenarios as extreme versions or caricatures of their present, as if they have acquired a mysterious search-light, that can be used to illuminate different parts of an otherwise murky, entangled situation. Our review of existing scenario building methods is done to help us amplify these moments of clarity that spark imagination and a pro-active engagement with the futures. We're also interested how to make the whole process more fluid, creative and mindful (of self, others and the environment). |
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| ==== Methods, comparisons ==== | ==== Methods, comparisons ==== |
| An overview a simple description of a scenario building process can be found in [[http://www.wired.com/wired/scenarios/build.html|How to Build Scenarios]] by Lawrence Wilkinson. Interesting [[http://www.openthefuture.com/2012/08/ten_rules_for_creating_awful_s.html| Ten Rules for Creating Awful Scenarios]] by Jamais Cascio, can be used as a checklist of what NOT to do in scenario building. | An overview a simple description of a scenario building process can be found in [[http://www.wired.com/wired/scenarios/build.html|How to Build Scenarios]] by Lawrence Wilkinson. Interesting [[http://www.openthefuture.com/2012/08/ten_rules_for_creating_awful_s.html| Ten Rules for Creating Awful Scenarios]] by Jamais Cascio, can be used as a checklist of what NOT to do in scenario building. |
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| "The paper to review all the techniques for developing scenarios that have appeared in the literature, along with comments on their utility, strengths and weaknesses. [...] eight categories of techniques that include a total of 23 variations used to develop scenarios. There are descriptions and evaluations for each." "Based on our review of the literature, we have discovered eight general categories (types) of scenario techniques with two to three variations for each type, resulting in more than two dozen techniques overall. There are, of course, variations of the variations." | <blockquote>The paper to review all the techniques for developing scenarios that have appeared in the literature, along with comments on their utility, strengths and weaknesses. [...] eight categories of techniques that include a total of 23 variations used to develop scenarios. There are descriptions and evaluations for each." "Based on our review of the literature, we have discovered eight general categories (types) of scenario techniques with two to three variations for each type, resulting in more than two dozen techniques overall. There are, of course, variations of the variations." |
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| - Judgment (genius forecasting, visualization, role playing, Coates and Jarratt) | - Judgment (genius forecasting, visualization, role playing, Coates and Jarratt) |
| - Modeling (trend impact analysis, sensitivity analysis, dynamic scenarios) | - Modeling (trend impact analysis, sensitivity analysis, dynamic scenarios) |
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| From [[http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/aboutus/whatwedo/PolicyAnalysis/UKHigherEducation/Futures/Documents/current_state_of_scenario_development_FORESIGHT.pdf|The current state of scenario development]] by Peter Bishop, Andy Hines and Terry Collins, Foresight, Vol. 9(1) | From [[http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/aboutus/whatwedo/PolicyAnalysis/UKHigherEducation/Futures/Documents/current_state_of_scenario_development_FORESIGHT.pdf|The current state of scenario development]] by Peter Bishop, Andy Hines and Terry Collins, Foresight, Vol. 9(1) </blockquote> |
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| Another attempt at scenario typology is the [[http://www.infra.kth.se/fms/pdf/ScenarioRapportVer1_1b.pdf|Towards a user's guide to scenarios]] by Lena Börjeson et al classifies scenarios into three categories and six types: | <blockquote>Another attempt at scenario typology is the [[http://www.infra.kth.se/fms/pdf/ScenarioRapportVer1_1b.pdf|Towards a user's guide to scenarios]] by Lena Börjeson et al classifies scenarios into three categories and six types: |
| - Predictive (Forecasts, What if) | - Predictive (Forecasts, What if) |
| - Explorative (External, Strategic) | - Explorative (External, Strategic) |
| - Generating techniques: generation of ideas and collection of data (surveys, Delphi, workshops) | - Generating techniques: generation of ideas and collection of data (surveys, Delphi, workshops) |
| - Integrating techniques: combining parts into wholes (time-series analysis, explanatory modelling, optimised modelling) | - Integrating techniques: combining parts into wholes (time-series analysis, explanatory modelling, optimised modelling) |
| - Consistency techniques: checking the consistency of scenarios (cross impact analysis, morphological field analysis) | - Consistency techniques: checking the consistency of scenarios (cross impact analysis, morphological field analysis)</blockquote> |
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| Curry, Andrew and Wendy Schultz (2009), [[http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/13-4/AE03.pdf|Roads Less Travelled]] in the Journal of Futures Studies, Vol. 13(4) made a comparison between different scenario methods: "Using four different scenario building methods: the 2x2 matrix approach; causal layered analysis; the Manoa approach; and the scenario archetypes approach. (...) This exploratory comparison confirmed that different scenario generation methods yield not only different narratives and insights, but qualitatively different participant experiences. (...) There is little in the literature which attempts to evaluate the different types of futures | <blockquote>Curry, Andrew and Wendy Schultz (2009), [[http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/13-4/AE03.pdf|Roads Less Travelled]] in the Journal of Futures Studies, Vol. 13(4) made a comparison between different scenario methods: "Using four different scenario building methods: the 2x2 matrix approach; causal layered analysis; the Manoa approach; and the scenario archetypes approach. (...) This exploratory comparison confirmed that different scenario generation methods yield not only different narratives and insights, but qualitatively different participant experiences. (...) There is little in the literature which attempts to evaluate the different types of futures insight which emerge when different scenarios methods are used, the way in which choice of method might influence the types of conversations which are enabled by different scenarios processes, or the benefits and risks in using one approach over another. (...) To some extent, any scenario method can be completed as a desk-top research exercise. But creating scenario processes that effectively create change means creating participatory processes: scenarios create new behaviour only insofar as they create new patterns of thinking across a significant population within an organisation. So how engaging is each method, and what kind of thinking, conversation, and energy does each method produce in participants? |
| insight which emerge when different scenarios methods are used, the way in which choice of method might influence the types of conversations which are enabled by different scenarios processes, or the benefits and risks in using one approach over another. (...) To some extent, any scenario method can be completed as a desk-top research exercise. But creating scenario processes that effectively create change means creating participatory processes: scenarios create new behaviour only insofar as they create new patterns of thinking across a significant population within an organisation. So how engaging is each method, and what kind of thinking, conversation, and energy does each method produce in participants? | |
| | Each of these scenario methods appears to have distinguishing strengths. The 2x2 matrix approach produces four scenarios consistently focused on alternative outcomes for an issue at a specific scale. CLA generates conversations that dig down into the worldviews, mental models and cultural structures that inform how we perceive both issues and possible future outcomes. Manoa creates a diverse array of details across all levels of a possible future. Scenario archetypes guarantee consideration of outcomes across a specified set of worldviews. Yet none by itself is really a 'perfect', all-purpose approach. These differences underline the need for people who commission futures work to understand clearly what they are trying to achieve through scenario building, and to remain open to the methods that are most likely to be effective in reaching the desired outcome. (...) The primary lesson we have learned from this exercise as active practitioners is the value of mash-ups: combining and layering different techniques to enrich outcomes." </blockquote> |
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| Each of these scenario methods appears to have distinguishing strengths. The 2x2 matrix approach produces four scenarios consistently focused on alternative outcomes for an issue at a specific scale. CLA generates conversations that dig down into the worldviews, mental models and cultural structures that inform how we perceive both issues and possible future outcomes. Manoa creates a diverse array of details across all levels of a possible future. Scenario archetypes guarantee consideration of outcomes across a specified set of worldviews. Yet none by itself is really a 'perfect', all-purpose approach. These differences underline the need for people who commission futures work to understand clearly what they are trying to achieve through scenario building, and to remain open to the methods that are most likely to be effective in reaching the desired outcome. (...) The primary lesson we have learned from this exercise as active practitioners is the value of mash-ups: combining and layering different techniques to enrich outcomes. " | |
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| Examples of (historical) scenario methods: | Examples of (historical) scenario methods: |
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| | === 2x2 Double Uncertainty === |
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| The scenario building exercise (step 1-6) in the [[prehearsal pocket guide]] is based on the 2x2 method by Peter Schwartz in The Art of the Long View. On [[http://scenariosforsustainability.org/recipes/schwartz.html|this page]] Schwartz summarises the scenario building steps. | The scenario building exercise (step 1-6) in the [[prehearsal pocket guide]] is based on the 2x2 method by Peter Schwartz in The Art of the Long View. On [[http://scenariosforsustainability.org/recipes/schwartz.html|this page]] Schwartz summarises the scenario building steps. |
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| "Causal layered analysis is offered as a new futures research method. It utility is not in predicting the future but in creating transformative spaces for the creation of alternative futures. Causal layered analysis consists of four levels: the litany, social causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor. The challenge is to conduct research that moves up and down these layers of analysis and thus is inclusive of different ways of knowing." -Sohail Inayatullah in [[|http://www.metafuture.org/Articles/CausalLayeredAnalysis.htm|CLA: poststructuralism as method]] and the [[http://metafuture.org/cla%20papers/Inayatullah%20%20Causal%20layered%20analysis%20-%20theory,%20historical%20context,%20and%20case%20studies.%20Intro%20chapter%20from%20The%20CLA%20Reader..pdf|CLA Reader]] | === Causal Layered Analysis === |
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| <html><a href="http://thinkingfutures.net/wp-content/uploads/cla1.jpg"><img src="http://thinkingfutures.net/wp-content/uploads/cla1.jpg"></a></html> | "Causal layered analysis is offered as a new futures research method. It utility is not in predicting the future but in creating transformative spaces for the creation of alternative futures. Causal layered analysis consists of four levels: the litany, social causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor. The challenge is to conduct research that moves up and down these layers of analysis and thus is inclusive of different ways of knowing." -Sohail Inayatullah in [[http://www.metafuture.org/Articles/CausalLayeredAnalysis.htm|CLA: poststructuralism as method]] and the [[http://metafuture.org/cla%20papers/Inayatullah%20%20Causal%20layered%20analysis%20-%20theory,%20historical%20context,%20and%20case%20studies.%20Intro%20chapter%20from%20The%20CLA%20Reader..pdf|CLA Reader]] |
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| | <html><a href="http://thinkingfutures.net/wp-content/uploads/cla1.jpg"><img src="http://thinkingfutures.net/wp-content/uploads/cla1.jpg" width="600"></a></html> |
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| * after reaching the bottom layer, pick a different myth/narrative and create a scenario by moving up the other layers, up to the new events and behaviours in 'litany' | * after reaching the bottom layer, pick a different myth/narrative and create a scenario by moving up the other layers, up to the new events and behaviours in 'litany' |
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| | === The Manoa Approach === |
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| | The [[http://www.infinitefutures.com/essays/prez/sandw/sld032.htm|Manoa approach]] "assumes that actual futures are generated by the turbulent intersection of multiple trends, and the interplay of their cascading impacts. Thus each Manoa scenario requires a base of at least three orthogonal drivers of change, preferably emerging issues or 'weak signals.' The design is best suited to creating scenarios 25+ years out, maximally different from the present: it aims to produce surprising scenarios that shake current working assumptions/ (...) Five steps: |
| | [1] choose 3-5 significant emerging issues of change ('weak signals'); \\ |
| | [2] brainstorm or mindmap the potential impact cascades of each, working one by one; \\ |
| | [3] consider the cross-impacts arising from the 3-5 drivers and their impacts working together; \\ |
| | [4] doublecheck the depth of detail using an ethnographic inventory; \\ |
| | [5] develop a summary metaphor or title \\ |
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| Joseph Coates wrote "Today the question of what scenarios are is unclear except with regard to one point-they have become extremely popular. Many people see scenarios as forecasts of some future condition while others disavow that their scenarios are forecasts. Yet looking at scenarios that do not come labeled as forecasts or non-forecasts. It is difficult to tell them apart. The purpose of the scenario is at a meta level, since the scenario usually does not speak for itself in terms of its purpose." [[http://www.josephcoates.com/pdf_files/232_Scenario_Planning.pdf|More in Scenario Planning]]. Another early in depth overview of [[http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fhz95g00/pdf;jsessionid=D034F49912B794C5CCE293059B4BA299.tobacco03|How Companies Use Scenarios]] was written by Mandel and Wilson. | <html><a href="https://www.emeraldinsight.com/content_images/fig/2730110302004.png"><img src="https://www.emeraldinsight.com/content_images/fig/2730110302004.png" width="400"></a></html> <html><a href="http://www.mepss.nl/tools/w07-fig1.gif"><img src="http://www.mepss.nl/tools/w07-fig1.gif"></a></html> |
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| <html><a href=http://horizon.unc.edu/courses/papers/Scenario_Figure2.gif"><img src="http://horizon.unc.edu/courses/papers/Scenario_Figure2.gif"></a></html> | ==== Four Generic Futures ==== |
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| | <blockquote> Our use of "alternative futures" (or "scenarios") is usually within the context of helping an organization or community plan for and move towards its preferred future. (...) I have chosen to explain our use of alternative futures as though I were telling an interested community or organization what the components of a futures visioning process are in our understanding and experience, and how to conduct the various parts of an overall futures visioning process.</blockquote> |
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| Michel Godet writes in [[http://en.laprospective.fr/dyn/anglais/articles/art_of_scenarios.pdf|The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning]]: "we strive to give | James Dator in [[http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/14-2/A01.pdf|Alternative Futures at the Manoa School]] |
| simple tools that may be appropriated. However, these simple tools are inspired by intellectual rigor that enables one to ask the right questions. Of course, these tools do not come with a guarantee. The natural talent,common sense, and intuition of the futurist also count!" | |
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| <html><a href=http://loganadia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/fig208_01_0.jpg"><img src="http://loganadia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/fig208_01_0.jpg"></a></html> | Dator discusses in length the process of creating four generic futures (Continue, Collapse, Discipline and Transform) - as four types of stories in which all/most future scenarios can be classified. |
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| | === Cone of Plausibility === |
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| The "Cone of Plausibility, according to [[http://www.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA231618&ei=rdUCU-3QBIeSkwWG5oCYBA&usg=AFQjCNFbeM4KuYTqsIZaZYoaNholFliILg&sig2=ipuUxnViugB2ksDibwNYHQ|Charles W. Taylor]], “serves as an enclosure that circumscribes the thought process of the players. The strength of their thought process to build these scenarios and to hold them together as they proceed outward in time is a counterforce to the pressures of wild cards to disrupt the cone. Scenarios within the cone are considered plausible if they ad|here to a logical progression of trends, events, and consequences from today to a predetermined time in the future” | The "Cone of Plausibility, according to [[http://www.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA231618&ei=rdUCU-3QBIeSkwWG5oCYBA&usg=AFQjCNFbeM4KuYTqsIZaZYoaNholFliILg&sig2=ipuUxnViugB2ksDibwNYHQ|Charles W. Taylor]], “serves as an enclosure that circumscribes the thought process of the players. The strength of their thought process to build these scenarios and to hold them together as they proceed outward in time is a counterforce to the pressures of wild cards to disrupt the cone. Scenarios within the cone are considered plausible if they ad|here to a logical progression of trends, events, and consequences from today to a predetermined time in the future” |
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| <html><a href=https://gs1.wac.edgecastcdn.net/8019B6/data.tumblr.com/tumblr_m8wsufwhnz1qz8vtso1_1280.jpg"><img src="https://gs1.wac.edgecastcdn.net/8019B6/data.tumblr.com/tumblr_m8wsufwhnz1qz8vtso1_1280.jpg"></a></html> | <html><a href=https://gs1.wac.edgecastcdn.net/8019B6/data.tumblr.com/tumblr_m8wsufwhnz1qz8vtso1_1280.jpg"><img src="https://gs1.wac.edgecastcdn.net/8019B6/data.tumblr.com/tumblr_m8wsufwhnz1qz8vtso1_1280.jpg"></a></html> |
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| | === Morphological Analysis / FAR === |
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| [[Morphological Analysis]] is a way to create one normative scenario, from which a number of critical uncertainties are selected and given a set of variables; by combining different variables several 'worlds' can be created, as stepping stones for a smaller set of branching scenario timelines. See also [[Field Anomaly Relaxation]]. | [[Morphological Analysis]] is a way to create one normative scenario, from which a number of critical uncertainties are selected and given a set of variables; by combining different variables several 'worlds' can be created, as stepping stones for a smaller set of branching scenario timelines. See also [[Field Anomaly Relaxation]]. |
| <html><a href=http://www.swemorph.com/graphics/z_box2.png"><img src="http://www.swemorph.com/graphics/z_box2.png"></a></html> | <html><a href=http://www.swemorph.com/graphics/z_box2.png"><img src="http://www.swemorph.com/graphics/z_box2.png"></a></html> |
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| | === Other methods === |
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| | Joseph Coates wrote "Today the question of what scenarios are is unclear except with regard to one point-they have become extremely popular. Many people see scenarios as forecasts of some future condition while others disavow that their scenarios are forecasts. Yet looking at scenarios that do not come labeled as forecasts or non-forecasts. It is difficult to tell them apart. The purpose of the scenario is at a meta level, since the scenario usually does not speak for itself in terms of its purpose." [[http://www.josephcoates.com/pdf_files/232_Scenario_Planning.pdf|More in Scenario Planning]]. Another early in depth overview of [[http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fhz95g00/pdf;jsessionid=D034F49912B794C5CCE293059B4BA299.tobacco03|How Companies Use Scenarios]] was written by Mandel and Wilson. |
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| | <html><a href="http://horizon.unc.edu/courses/papers/Scenario_Figure2.gif"><img src="http://horizon.unc.edu/courses/papers/Scenario_Figure2.gif"></a></html> |
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| | Michel Godet writes in [[http://en.laprospective.fr/dyn/anglais/articles/art_of_scenarios.pdf|The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning]]: "we strive to give |
| | simple tools that may be appropriated. However, these simple tools are inspired by intellectual rigor that enables one to ask the right questions. Of course, these tools do not come with a guarantee. The natural talent,common sense, and intuition of the futurist also count!" |
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| | <html><a href=http://loganadia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/fig208_01_0.jpg"><img src="http://loganadia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/fig208_01_0.jpg"></a></html> |
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| Anna Maria Orru and David Relan wrote [[:/resilients/scenario_symphony|The Scenario Symphony]] for the Resilients project, containing a whole range of scenario creation methods, including the dynamic [[:/resilients/from_pan_to_panarchy|panarchy]] and [[:/resilients/temporal model]]. | Anna Maria Orru and David Relan wrote [[:/resilients/scenario_symphony|The Scenario Symphony]] for the Resilients project, containing a whole range of scenario creation methods and techniques, including the dynamic [[:/resilients/from_pan_to_panarchy|panarchy]] and [[:/resilients/temporal model]]. |
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| <html><a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/foam/8480321093/" title="figure5 by _foam, on Flickr"><img src="https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8505/8480321093_4d0379e220_c.jpg" width="800" height="354" alt="figure5"></a></html> | <html><a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/foam/8480321093/" title="figure5 by _foam, on Flickr"><img src="https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8505/8480321093_4d0379e220_c.jpg" width="800" height="354" alt="figure5"></a></html> |
| * success criteria (what will make my question succeed or fail) | * success criteria (what will make my question succeed or fail) |
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| ==== Change Drivers ==== | ==== Change Drivers & Weak Signals ==== |
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| * how much analysis is appropriate for the types of scenarios and prehearsals we’re making? | * how much analysis is appropriate for the types of scenarios and prehearsals we’re making? |
| * how can we make assumptions and guesswork more apparent (i.e. indicating how drivers can be based on an assumption, guess or 'fact')? | * how can we make assumptions and guesswork more apparent (i.e. indicating how drivers can be based on an assumption, guess or 'fact')? |
| * what is the relevance of facts and data related to macro trends in experiential futurism? | * what is the relevance of facts and data related to drivers of change in experiential futurism? |
| * how can we have a more constructive discussion about the macro trends which results in something more meaningful than a list of assumptions? | * can we have a more constructive discussion about the macro trends which results in something more meaningful than a list of assumptions (without too much expert analysis needed beforehand)? |
| * how do we look at drivers as dynamic forces? should we be looking at responses to trends rather than trends in general? (nouns -> verbs) | |
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| //What are existing ways of discussing trends with groups of people?// | //How do we look at drivers as dynamic forces? should we be looking at responses to trends rather than trends in general? // |
| * See various methods on the [[horizon scanning]] page | (nouns -> verbs) |
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| | * [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futures_wheel|Futures Wheel]] |
| | * [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_impact_analysis|Cross Impact Analysis]] |
| | * [[www.cgee.org.br%2Fatividades%2FredirKori%2F3302&ei=pPsGU_XvEMilkQXExYHICQ&usg=AFQjCNGIGowNnzsRvhMCmohNKF986pAUGA&sig2=eYuhWVzgsrzKAMYkb3SXaA&bvm=bv.61725948,d.dGI&cad=rja|Trend Impact Analysis]] (quantitative) |
| | * MA/FAR (see below) |
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| * should we make our own STEEP (or related) cards to avoid the 'business bias'? probably, if we have the time - and focus on long term trends only + add wild cards (random images/words/tarot/playing cards...). | // should we make our own STEEP (or related) cards to avoid the 'business bias'?// probably, if we have the time - and focus on long term trends only + add wild cards (random images/words/tarot/playing cards...). |
| * are there other well understood methods to group trends other than the customary STEEP (in which cultural changes seem to be clumped in with social or political)? see [[horizon scanning]] and [[http://www.slideshare.net/wendyinfutures/summary-of-verge-ethnographic-futures-framework-devised-by-richard-lum-and-michele-bowman|Ethnographic Futures Framework]] | * are there other well understood methods to group trends other than the customary STEEP (in which cultural changes seem to be clumped in with social or political)? see [[horizon scanning]] and [[http://www.slideshare.net/wendyinfutures/summary-of-verge-ethnographic-futures-framework-devised-by-richard-lum-and-michele-bowman|Ethnographic Futures Framework]] |
| * is there another way to look at large scale changes aside from trends (without having to do a PhD in each of the changes)? | |
| * how effective are these methods and how can we usefully evalute them? | //Is there another way to look at large scale changes aside from trends (without having to do a PhD in each of the changes)?// |
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| | * weak signals, emerging issues, historical analogues |
| | * the Manoa approach says looks at emerging issues rather than drivers of change - ref. needed... |
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| | // How effective are these methods and how can we usefully evaluate them?// |
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| | It seems to be a big academic issue (see thesis by Mihaela Ghisa) |
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| ==== Ranking critical uncertainties ==== | ==== Ranking critical uncertainties ==== |
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| | (this is relevant only for the 2x2 scenario method. other methods use more axes (but are equally vague about how to select them) |
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| * what are different ways in which this is done by others? most approaches i could find use numbers, or conversation. | * what are different ways in which this is done by others? most approaches i could find use numbers, or conversation. |
| * __Branch analysis method__: The ‘branch analysis’ method is suited to developing scenarios around specific turning-points that are known in advance (e.g. elections, a referendum or peace process). This approach works best for a shorter time horizon: generally up to five years.[[http://www.eisf.eu/resources/download.asp?d=5764|The Horizon Scanning Centre (pdf)]] | * __Branch analysis method__: The ‘branch analysis’ method is suited to developing scenarios around specific turning-points that are known in advance (e.g. elections, a referendum or peace process). This approach works best for a shorter time horizon: generally up to five years.[[http://www.eisf.eu/resources/download.asp?d=5764|The Horizon Scanning Centre (pdf)]] |
| * __Cone of plausibility__ method: offers a more deterministic model of the way in which drivers lead to outcomes, by explicitly listing assumptions and how these might change. Of the three techniques, this approach is most suitable for shorter-term time horizons (e.g. a few months to 2-3 years), but can be used to explore longer-term time horizons. It also suits contexts with a limited number of important drivers.[[http://www.eisf.eu/resources/download.asp?d=5764|The Horizon Scanning Centre (pdf)]] | * __Cone of plausibility__ method: offers a more deterministic model of the way in which drivers lead to outcomes, by explicitly listing assumptions and how these might change. Of the three techniques, this approach is most suitable for shorter-term time horizons (e.g. a few months to 2-3 years), but can be used to explore longer-term time horizons. It also suits contexts with a limited number of important drivers.[[http://www.eisf.eu/resources/download.asp?d=5764|The Horizon Scanning Centre (pdf)]] |
| | * CLA: probing deeper cultural foundations of core issues |
| | * Manoa approach: "the scenarios it produces are generally much longer-term, and far more divergent / transformative in their structure -- for sophisticated clients only, or to enhance creativity and innovation in R&D and product design staff. The resulting scenarios also work well as provocations in incasting exercises" From http://www.infinitefutures.com/tools/sb.shtml |
| | * Harman Fan: "thinking through the multiple causalities that produce an infinite array of alternative possible futures" http://www.infinitefutures.com/tools/sbharman.ppt |
| | * etc (see in methods above) |
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| * [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_fiction|Flash Fiction]] | * [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_fiction|Flash Fiction]] |
| * "a day in the life of..." (a character in a scenario, or one character in different scenarios) | * "a day in the life of..." (a character in a scenario, or one character in different scenarios) |
| | * ... |
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| * How can we follow-up what happens to the groups after we finish the workshops (especially to understand what happens to commitments to actions and preferred possible futures)? | * How can we follow-up what happens to the groups after we finish the workshops (especially to understand what happens to commitments to actions and preferred possible futures)? |
| * How much do we need to be involved in the follow-up? | * How much do we need to be involved in the follow-up? |
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| | It all depends on the purpose of the workshop... |
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nik